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In the Stlpt·e~ne Cottrt of tl1c 
State of Utal1 
FLORENCE BUCKLEY. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STANLEY COX and ALICE T. COX, 
his wife, and KARL COX, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
CASE 
NO. 7730 
This suit was brought in the court below by the plain-
tiff, Florence Buckley, against the defendants, Stanley Cox 
and Alice T. Cox, his wife, and Karl Cox, for damages 
caused by defendants' unlawful use of a driveway on plain-
tiff's premises in Provo, Utah, and the complaint prayed 
for a restraining order against the continued unlawful use 
of the driveway and also for an order quieting title there-
to in the plaintiff. We deem is necessary to supplement 
the statement made by appellants in their brief in order 
to more clearly show the claims of the parties and the 
findings and judgment of the trial court. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT 
The plaintiff in count one of her complaint claims own-
ership of a home and premises situated at 914 North Uni-
versity Avenue in Provo, Utah, the same being described 
by metes and bounds; that the North 12 feet of plaintiff's 
premises is used for a driveway by means of which plain-
tiff gets in and out of the rear of her premises; that for 
the past 3 years the defendants have violated the plaintiff's 
rights by using the driveway so as to deprive her of the 
use of her property to her damage; that although plaintiff 
has demanded that the defendants cease such use, they 
refuse and persist in so using the driveway and threaten 
to continue to do so; that unless restrained defendants will 
continue such harassing use of plaintiff's driveway, which 
is doing plaintiff irreparable damage for which she has no 
adequate remedy at law, and that plaintiff has sustained 
$1,000.00 damages. 
In count two of the complaint plaintiff reiterates her 
ownership of the premises, including the driveway, and 
further claims that defendants' claim an adverse interest 
which is inferior to that of the plaintiff and without right 
or title to the same ( JR 3-6). 
Defendants in their answer to count one of plaintiff's 
complaint admit plaintiff's ownership of the home and the 
premises immediately South of the home owned by de-
fendants Stanley Cox and Alice T. c·ox, but claim there is 
a driveway 12 feet wide between the two properties, which 
defndants use and will continue to use unless restrained; 
defendants claim that the North line of the plaintiff and 
the South line of the defendants' properties is the middle 
line of the driveway and has been so maintained for more 
than 20 years; that defendants and their predecessors have 
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used the same as a joint d.rive\vay for more than 30 years 
adversely to the plaintiff and under claim of right; defend-
ants admit the uses that plaintiff claimed they had made 
of the drive\vay for 22 years prior to this suit and that 
their predecessors used same for 10 years before that; de-
fendants claim further that plaintiff "consented" to such 
use by defendants until within the last 3 years; and the 
use by plaintiff of her home as claimed by her, the location 
of the driveway from her residence and the written demand 
that the defendants cease using the driveway is admitted 
by defendants. They deny the plaintiff's injury is irrepar-
able and that she has suffered the claimed damages. 
Defendants admit, deny and allege in their answer to 
count two substantially as they did to count one. 
Defendants Stanley Cox and Alice T. Cox counter-
claim, alleging joint O\vnership of the premises known as 
942 North University Avenue in Provo, Utah, describing 
the same by metes and bounds; defendants claim that the 
South 6 feet and the 6 feet immediately South thereof is 
a joint driveway and appurtenant to plaintiff's and defend-
ants' property; and that plaintiff claims an interest in the 
driveway adverse to the defendants which is inferior to de-
fendants' claims (JR 7-10). 
In her reply plaintiff denied the affirmative claims 
made by defendants in their answer, admits that defend-
ants Stanley Cox and Alice T. Cox own the property de-
scribed in their counterclaim and specifically denies that 
the metes and bounds description there set forth is cor-
rect and denies the other allegations of the countercl.aim 
(JR 11-13). 
The issues drawn by the foregoing pleadings upon 
which the case was tried were twofold: 
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(1) Have the defendants title to any part of the 
driveway, or does defendants' South line extend to the cen-
ter of the 12-foot driveway in question? 
(2) Have defendants and their predecessors used 
the disputed driveway adversely to the plaintiff under claim 
of right for more than 20 years? 
Upon these issues the case was tried to the court and 
the respective parties adduced evidence in support of their 
respective claims. The court decided in favor of plaintiff 
generally, except plaintiff was not allowed any damages, 
and against the claims of the defendants. Accordingly, find-
ings, conclusions, and judgment were duly entered (JR 
15-23). 
From an order denying defendants' motion ·to amend 
findings, conclusions, and judgment and for a new trial, 
defendants appeal ( JR 26-29), and assailed findings num-
bered 2, 8, 9a, 9b, He, and 9d, as being unsupported by the 
evidence; also claiming that the findings and conclusions 
are insufficient to support the judgment and that the court 
err:ed in denying the motion for a new trial and in entering 
judgment against the defendants (A. Br. 7-9). 
The issues raised by this appeal are: 
(1) Is there any substantial, competent evidence in 
the record which supports the assailed findings? and 
(2) Did the court properly apply the law to facts 
found in granting judgment to the plaintiff? 
We shall first briefly reply to the argument made by 
appellants in their brief and then discuss the issues raised 
in the order above indicated. 
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THE ARGUMENT 
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS IN REBUTTAL OF 
THE ARGUMENT MADE BY DEFENDANTS IN THEIR 
BRIEF. 
Defendants spend 4~ :2 pages of their brief (A. Br. 3-7) 
detailing certain of the testin1ony of certain witnesses who 
testified in the trial of the case. Ohvious.ly the testimony 
referred to is that most favorable to the defendants' con-
tentions. This same evidence was referred to by defend-
ants' counsel in argument before the trial court at the close 
of the case. This testimony, ·along \Vith all the evidence 
in the case, was considered by the trial court before mak-
ing his decision. Indeed, the trial court's findings, conclu-
sions, and judgment were made ~after weighing all the evi-
dence and undoubtedly by giving greater credence to that 
supporting the plaintiff's claims. The indication by defend-
ants of evidence most favorable to their claim does not es-
tablish defendants' contentions on this appeal that the evi-
dence on the whole record is insufficient to support · the 
court's findings. 
Defendants open their argument with the contention 
that the plaintiff knew defendants adversely claimed the 
right to use the driveway and that this situation continued 
by plaintiff's "sufferance" for ·more than 20 years (A. Br. 
9). Our answer to this claim is that defendants have seized 
upon bits of evidence from the record which were not be-
lieved by the court before the findings were made. 
Defendants then move on to their point one and say. 
"The evidence is conclusive that the North 3.9 feet of the 
drive\vay is not within the description of the premises set 
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forth in paragraph 1 of the findings." Again we point out 
that this is not the case and that defendants have again 
seized upon one bit of evidence in the record and have 
failed to consider all the evidence which the trial court con-
sidered in making a finding the exact opposite from de-
fendants' contention. For example, in support of this con-
tention plaintiff cites the witness Beazer (Tr. 61) who there 
testified that from the description of plaintiff's property, 
as it appears in finding 1, the point of beginning is thro-vvn 
3.9 feet South of the survey line between plaintiff's and de-
fendants' properties. Defendants fail, however, to indi-
cate Beazer's testimony on redirect examination (Tr. 62-
63) and the testimony of George S. Ballif ( Tr. 37-65) , 
which establish the fact that there is no 3.9-foot gap on 
the North of plaintiff's property and that her North line 
coincides with the South line of the defendants. This is 
principally found to be true by both Beazer and Balli£ be-
cause in the description, to which reference is made in 
finding 1, there is also the clarifying call that "said point 
of beginning being on the South line of the Stanley Cox 
land." The court considered all of the evidence in this mat-
ter and made the assailed finding number 2, which we sub-
mit is well supported by the great preponderance of the 
evidence. 
Defendants then argue collectively all of their other 
points, except point 11, and generally contend that the 
"findings on which the judgment is based that defendants 
have not established a right to the driveway either as joint 
owner or by adverse possession" are insufficient. After 
stating the rule as to the establishment of an easement by 
prescription, the argument proceeds as follows: 
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(a) Because defendant Cox and defendants' witness 
Taylor testified favorably to defendants' claim (A. Br. 
10)' 
(b) Because the plaintiff testified (A. Br. 11) that 
defendants' use of the drive,vay was made by "sufferance" 
on the part of plaintiff and one of the definitions given in 
vVebster's Dictionary contains the words "forbearance un-
der provocation," even though the plaintiff, as part of her 
asnwer, also stated that the use was "by permission", (In-
deed, Webster's New International Dictionary, reference 
history edition (1925), defines sufferance as indicated 
above and also in the next paragraph as "negative consent 
by not forbidding or hindering; toleration; permission; al-
lowance; leave.'') 
(c) And because this court has held that the testi-
mony of a witness is no stronger than his cross-examina-
tion. 
That because of the foregoing, therefore, the finding 
that the defendants had not used the driveway adversely 
to the plaintiff constitutes error. 
In answer we call attention again to the fact that the 
court has considered all of the evidence and has evidently 
believed that which sustains plaintiff's claims and disbe-
lieved much of that given to support defendants' claims. 
The plaintiff on her cross-examination cleared up any doubt 
the court may have had in his mind with respect to her 
giving permission to defendants to use the driveway in her 
testimony quoted by defendants in their brief (Tr. 35) . 
This whole question was for the court, inasmuch as neither 
party demanded a jury, and the Novback case (A. Br. 12) 
sustains that view. 
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rrhe defendants throw in at this point the argument 
that "probably" the defendants' North line is determined 
by an old fence established there before defendants ac-
quired their property. We cannot believe that this argu-
ment is seriously made because there is no issue or evi-
dence in the case at bar as to the North boundary other 
than the survey line shown on plaintiff's Exhibit "C.". 
The final contention made by defendants in their ar-
gument is point 11, that the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law are insufficient to support the judgment. This 
argument is made on the defendants' claim that the de-
scription doesn't cover the North 3.9 feet of the driveway. 
As we have indicated above, the great preponderance of 
the evidence shows that the North line of plaintiff's prop-
erty and the South line of defendants' property coincide, 
as shown by the survey line of same in plaintiff's E·xhibit 
"C". 
II. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVI-
DENCE IN THE RECORD WHICH SUPPORTS THE 
ASSAIUED FINDINGS. 
The findings of the trial court of which the defend-
ants complain on this appeal may be summarized as fol-
lows: That the North 12 feet of plaintiff's described land 
. is a driveway owned by her and used by her to gain access 
to the rear of her property from University Avenue (JR 
61); and that the claims of the defendants to the plain-
tiff's land are inferior to the claims of the plaintiff, and de-
fendants have no estate, right, title, or interest therein 
(JR-17). 
The affirmative allegations of defendants' answer and 
counterclaim were found by the trial court to be untrue 
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as follo\vs: That it is untrue that the North line of plain-
tiff's land and the South line of defendants' land is the 
middle line of the drive\vay; that it is untrue that said 
drive\vay line has been agreed upon and maintained as the 
division line for 20 years; that it is untrue that defend-
ants and predecessors have used same as a joint driveway 
for 30 years preceding the commencement of this action; 
that it is untrue that defendants' use of the driveway has 
been under claim of right and adverse to the plaintiff's 
claim; that it is untrue that defendants have driven trucks, 
auton1obiles, and \Valked over the said driveway for 22 
years and their predecessors for 10 years before that; and 
that it is untrue that such use by defendants of the joint 
drive\vay \Vas consented to by plaintiff and, until within 
the last 3 years, plaintiff never requested defendants not 
to use same but on the contrary claimed it was the joint 
driveway of plaintiff and defendants (JR 17-19). 
It is further found that it is untrue that defendants 
O\vn the South 6 feet of plaintiff's driveway or that it is 
a joint driveway or appurtenant to defendants' property; 
and that it is untrue that plaintiff's claim to the driveway 
is inferior to the rights and claims of the defendants there-
to (JR 19). 
The defendants having assailed these findings as not 
being supported by the evidence, and this being a law case, 
the followng la\V established by Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 U. 
481, 39 P2d 1070, 1072, is applicable: 
"These findings are challenged by defendants, 
who claim that there is not sufficient evidence to war-
rant such findings thus made by the court. This be-
ing a law case (Norback v. Board of Directors, etc., 
84 U. 506, 37 P. (2d) 339), this court is not permitted 
under the Constitution or the statutes to weigh the 
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evidence. If there is any substantial competent evi-
dence in the record to support the court's findings or 
the verdict of the jury, the judgment will not be dis- · 
turbed in the absence of some error of law prejudicial 
to appellant. Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 Utah, 307, 231 
P. 112; Brown v. Union Pac. R. ~Co., 76 Utah, 475, 290 
P. 759. With this standard in mind we shall briefly 
review the evidence upon which the trial court made 
its findings." 
In that case, as in the instant case, defendants claimed 
an easernent by prescription over plaintiff's ground and 
the court made findings for plaintiff, and the defendants 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support them. 
The court reviewed the evidence by the above quoted stan-
dard and finding substantial competent evidence support-
ing the findings, they were sustained. 
Applying this law to the instant case, let us briefly 
review the evidence upon which the trial court made the 
assailed findings: 
The plaintiff, Florence Buckley, testified that she has 
lived in the home on the premises at 914 North University 
Avenue in Provo, Utah, which she now owns, for more 
than 50 years (Tr. 3); that she knows the premises ad-
joining her place on the North and the Coxs and Taylors 
who have occupied these premises since about 1924 (Tr. 
4, 5, and 9); that the driveway in question is about 12 feet 
wide and runs East from University Avenue on plaintiff's 
premises ( Tr. 6-8) ; that the said driveway was established 
by plaintiff's father and has been in its present location 
for at least 50 years and was the only way of getting into 
plaintiff's place (Tr. 6); that there is a hedge along the 
plaintiff's North boundary, planted by Taylor when he 
lived on defendants' property in about 1925, and it was 
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there \vhen defendants moved on their premises in 1927 
(Tr. 8-9); that plaintiff's father built the home on plain-
tiff's premises in 1898 and the plaintiff acquired the prem-
ises from her father's estate in 1938 (Tr. 3, 4, and 5) ; that 
the drive\vay \vas used by plaintiff and her folks to bring 
coal and hay into the rear of the permises and plaintiff's 
father gave her uncle permission to use same to bring coal 
into his coal shed (Tr. 11-13); that when Taylor moved 
on defendants' premises plaintiff gave .him permission to 
use the drive\vay (Tr. 12-13); that \vhen defendants, in 
1927, moved on the adjoining premises plaintiff gave Cox 
permission to use the driveway, and Cox, as consideration 
therefor, helped plaintiff pay for cementing the approach 
from University Avenue to the driveway, and c·ox used it 
to bring his coal in until he established a driveway on the 
North side of his home (Tr. 13-14); that after defendants 
established the driveway on the North side of their land 
they didn't use plaintiff's driveway for a number of years 
(Tr. 14-15) and that defendants first started to claim the 
right to use plaintiff's driveway adversely to her in the 
summer of 1948, and that the defendants never claimed the 
right to do so before that time (Tr. 15-18). 
George S. Balli£ qualified as an expert in title exam-
inations and testified that he examined the Abstract of 
Title to plaintiff's property, which contained a boundary 
deed wherein defendants' property is described, and found 
title vested in the plaintiff (Tr. 37-39); and that the legal 
description of the plaintiff's property contained in the Ab-
stract ties into and coincides with the legal description 
contained in defendants' deed and establishes the boundary 
bet\veen the t\vo properties, it being the North line of the 
plaintiff's and the South line of the defendants' respective 
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properties (Tr. 39-44). (Exhibit "A" is the Abstract and 
was received in evidence). 
William A. Beazer, having qualified as an expert ]and 
surveyor, testified that he ~made a survey and established 
the boundary line between the respective properties of 
plaintiff and defendants, tying the same to the Northeast 
corner of Section 1, and that he made a plat showing same, 
plaintiff's Exhibit "C", which shows the said boundary 
line to run along the middle of the hedge (Tr. 52-56); and 
that the surveyor established and described the lines run 
on the said map, and Exhibit "C" was received in evidence 
reflecting the result of the survey (Tr. 57-59). 
Clark Newell testified that he has known plaintiff and 
the premises in question, including the driveway, for 45 
or 50 years, and has kept cows there and has used the 
pasture to the East (Tr. 135); that gates separated the 
driveway from the pasture to the East and when the hay 
was taken to the barn the gates had to be opened and these 
gates were taken down by him in 1940 (Tr. 136-138); that 
over all the time he has known the driveway he has never 
seen the defendants use it or do anything ,to improve it nor 
has he seen any car belonging to defendants standing on 
it (Tr. 138-140); and there never was any turn into de-
fendants' property along the North side of the driveway 
(Tr. 140). 
Fred J. Richin testified that he had known plaintiff 
and the premises, including the driveway, for more than 
50 years, and has never observed defendants using the 
driveway during that time until 1948 or 1949 (Tr. 146), 
nor clean nor make any improvements thereon (Tr. 148). 
Ernest F. Buckley testified that he is 81 years of age 
and has lived on the plaintiff's premises since his father 
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built the home there, and that he has lived there continu-
ously for the last 25 years and is acquainted with the drive-
\vay and the defendants, and over that period he never saw 
defendants' cars in the drive\vay until a couple of years 
ago when the trouble began (Tr. 151); that there was no 
trouble about the drive\vay before that time because the 
defendants didn't use the drive\vay enough and he never 
saw defendants haul sand, gravel, or cinders on it, and 
that he and his sister cleaned the driveway (Tr. 152-153). 
Such then is the plaintiff's evidence upon which the 
trial court made the challenged findings. As was said by 
this court in Jensen v. Gerrard, supra, page 1072: 
"As this is a law action, the question is not wheth-
er the evidence would have supported the decision in 
favor of the appellants, but whether the decision made 
by the trial court finds support in the evidence. If 
there is competent credible evidence to support the 
findings made by the trial court, then those findings 
should stand . . . . . '' 
We submit that the assailed findings are supported by 
substantial, competent, credible evidence and they should, 
therefore, be sustained. 
TIL THE CO,URT PROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW 
TO THE FACTS FO·UND IN GRANTING JUDGMENT 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
The case turned on defendants' claim that they had 
a prescriptive right to use the driveway in question. The 
evidence was in conflict on this point and the trial court 
fo~nd in favor of plainrtff and against defendants. In so 
doing, the court properly applied the law. We believe that 
the controlling lavv applicable to the case at bar is set forth 
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in Jensen vs. Gerrard, supra. In that case this court laid 
down the law as to the burden of proof, the requisites of 
prescription and the presumption which arises, in the fol-
lowing language: 
"Since the defendants claimed the right to use 
the roadway by prescription, the ·burden was upon 
them to establish such claim by· clear and satisfactory 
evidence. 
(Citing 2 Tiffany on Real Property (2d Ed.) Sec. 519, 
p. 2046; 19 C. J. 958, Sec. 181; I Jones' Comm. on Evid. 
522.) 
". . . . . Before a right of way can be acquired 
by prescription, the use for the prescriptive period 
must be peaceable, continuous, open, adverse as of 
right, and with the knowledge and acquiescence of the 
plaintiff and his grantors and predecessors in interest. 
Actual notice to the owner of the servient etate is not 
necessary if the user is so notorious that in the exer-
cise of reasonable diligence the owner should learn 
thereof; then he will have constructive notice of the 
user which is sufficient. 
(Citing Dahl v. Roach, 76 Utah, 74, 287 P. 622; Bol-
ton v. Murphy, 41 Utah, 591, 127 P. 355; Crosier v. 
Brown, 66 W. Va. 273, 66 S. E. 326, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
174; Gardner v. Swann, 114 Ga. 304, 40 S. E. 271, 
Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P. 843, 
35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 941; Watson v. Board of County Com-
missioners, 38 Wash. 662, 80 P. 201; 2 Tiffany on Real 
Property (2d Ed.,) Sec. 521). 
"A twenty-year use alone of a way is not suffi-
cient to establish an easement. Mere use of a road-
way opened by a landowner for his own purpose \Viii 
be presumed permissive. An antagonistic or adverse 
use of a vvay cannot spring from a permissive use. A 
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prescriptive title must be acquired adversely. It can-
not be adverse \vhen it rests upon a license or mere 
neighborly accon1modation. Adverse user is the anti-
thesis of permissive user. If the use is accompanied 
by any recognition in express terms or by implication 
of a right in the lando,vner to stop such use now or at 
some time in the future, the use is not adverse." 
(Citing 2 Tiffany, supra, Sec. 519; Horne v. I--Iopper, 
72 Colo. 434, 211 P. 665; Eddy v. Demichelis, 100 Cal. 
App. 517, 280 P. 389). 
The defendants failed to sustain the burden of proof 
as required by law to establish a prescriptive right to the 
use of the drive\vay measured by the foregoing necessary 
requisites of the law. 
The driveway was established by the plaintiff's father 
more than 50 years ago over his own land for "his own pur-
pose" and the convenient use thereof. This use was con-
tinued by the plaintiff after she acquired the title. What 
use the defendants and their predecessors made of the 
drive\vay over the past 30 years is presumed, under the 
doctrine of the Gerrard case, to be permissive. :Certainly 
defendants adduced no evidence to overcome such a pre-
sumption. Plaintiff's evidence shows that as soon as de-
fendants began asserting title adversely to the plaintiff in 
1948, the plaintiff denied their claims and continued to 
do so until this lawsuit resulted. 
The Gerrard case has been approved and followed in 
the following late Utah cases: 
Savage v. Nielsen (Utah, 1948) 197 P2d 117, 123. 
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Cache County Poultry 
Growers Assn. (Utah, 1949) 209 P2d 251, 256. 
Sdrales v. Rondos (Utah, 1949) 209 P2d 562, 565. 
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See also cases supporting this rule in 170 A.L .. R. 825. 
These cases are conclusive of the law applicable to the case 
at bar, and the court correctly applied the same here. 
CONCLUSIO·N 
The challenged findings being supported by substan-
tial competent evidence; the trial court having properly ap~ 
plied the law of the case to the facts found; we submit that 
the findings and conclusions support the judgment of the 
court below and the same should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE S. BALUIF, 
BALLIF & EGGERTSEN, 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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